查看購物車
  • Simplified Chinese
  • English
  • Japanese
中國汽車半導體市場：按零件分類、全球半導體出口趨勢、中國半導體出口目的地趨勢、策略建議
市場調查報告書
商品編碼
1759939

中國汽車半導體市場：按零件分類、全球半導體出口趨勢、中國半導體出口目的地趨勢、策略建議

China Semiconductor Market for Automotive by Component (Microcontroller, Power Semiconductor, Sensor & MEMS Device, Memory Chip, Analog & Mixed Signal IC), Global & China Semiconductor Export, Alternate Destination - Trends and Strategic Recommendation
出版日期: | 出版商: MarketsandMarkets | 英文 104 Pages | 訂單完成後即時交付

價格

到2024年，中國汽車半導體出口額將達到4,191.5億美元，高於2020年的2,808.1億美元，複合年成長率為8.9%，這得益於自動駕駛汽車和電動車銷量的成長。

中國汽車半導體市場正吸引國內外企業龐大投資。中芯國際、華為海思、長江儲存、比亞迪半導體和紫光集團等領導企業主導國內半導體市場的發展，而英特爾、三星和SK海力士等國際企業則透過合資企業和新建製造工廠擴大其影響力。中國政府正透過國家積體電路產業投資基金（簡稱「大基金」）、地方政府基金、補貼、稅收減免和低利率貸款等政策支持該市場，力求自給自足並建構完整的供應鏈。隨著全球對先進電子和汽車技術的需求飆升，中國正利用香港作為貿易中心，向全球出口半導體。現代汽車（尤其是電動車和聯網汽車）的興起，顯著增加了對半導體的需求。這些汽車需要先進的晶片來實現動力傳動系統控制、高級駕駛輔助、資訊娛樂和電池管理。因此，汽車產業已成為中國半導體成長的主要驅動力。

記憶體晶片在中國汽車半導體市場排名第二。隨著人工智慧、資料中心、消費性電子產品和先進汽車技術的推動，資料儲存和資料處理需求飆升，記憶體晶片也在全球半導體產業中佔據第二位。記憶體晶片對於電子設備中資料的儲存和搜尋至關重要，支援從應用程式執行到即時系統運行的所有功能。對於依賴大量數據實現資訊娛樂、ADAS、無人駕駛等功能的現代汽車而言，記憶體晶片至關重要。記憶體晶片廣泛應用於高階資訊娛樂系統、ADAS和儀錶板。由於複雜的計算和數據處理需求，電動車和自動駕駛汽車需要更大的記憶體。在加強成熟節點晶片國產化的同時，中國正致力於在先進記憶體技術（尤其是NAND和DRAM）方面取得重大進展，長江儲存和長鑫儲存等公司處於領先地位。長江儲存已經開發出先進的3D TLC NAND晶片，可以與三星和美光等全球領導者競爭。中芯國際也為華為Mate 60 Pro生產7奈米晶片。

印度是世界第二大電子設備、積體電路和記憶體晶片進口國。這主要歸功於該國強勁的電子產業、數位化以及缺乏大規模的國內半導體製造業。到 2024 年，光是從中國進口的電子積體電路就將達到 610 萬美元。這些組件對於汽車領域的資訊娛樂、ADAS、遠端訊息和數位儀錶板等高級功能至關重要，這些功能需要龐大的記憶體和處理能力。受消費者對連結性、安全性和電氣化日益成長的需求的推動，印度的高級汽車功能市場正在快速成長。在混合動力汽車動力和電動車快速採用和製造 (FAME) 計劃等政府舉措的支持下，電動車和聯網汽車的普及正在加速。對印度電子和半導體生態系統的投資也在增加，國內外公司都在擴大生產和研發。印度政府推出了一系列獎勵計劃，例如針對電子產品製造業的「生產連結獎勵計劃」（PLI），進一步刺激了對進口記憶體和積體電路的需求，因為國內供應難以跟上。近期的例子包括塔塔汽車和馬恆達等汽車製造商在其最新車款中融入先進的電子產品，這反映出印度汽車和電子產業技術主導成長的普遍趨勢。

本報告深入分析了中國汽車半導體市場，重點關注各種類型的半導體，包括微控制器、功率半導體、感測器和MEMS裝置、儲存晶片、類比和混合訊號積體電路等。報告也檢驗了出口趨勢、貿易政策和法規的影響，以及半導體產業在中國以外的多元化發展。報告也探討了替代生產地點，並對這些地點進行了比較分析，以及轉型過程中面臨的挑戰和策略。

此外，該報告評估了全球汽車產業對半導體市場的影響，並提供了未來展望。報告還提供了推動中國半導體市場成長的關鍵因素的詳細資訊。對主要產業參與企業的深入分析，提供了對其業務概況、產品供應、關鍵策略、合約、夥伴關係、協議、新產品發布、併購活動的深入了解。

本報告為市場領導和新進業者提供了有關中國汽車半導體市場及其細分市場收益估算的寶貴資訊。它將幫助相關人員了解競爭格局，更有效地定位業務，並制定合適的打入市場策略。此外，報告還深入分析了當前的市場情勢，並重點介紹了產業內的關鍵促進因素、限制因素、挑戰和機會。

目錄

第1章 引言

第2章 中國汽車半導體產業

  • 中國汽車半導體現狀
    • 微控制器
    • 功率半導體
    • 感測器和MEMS
    • 記憶體晶片
    • 類比和混合訊號積體電路
  • 市場估值

第3章：中國汽車半導體產業主要參與企業

  • 國內廠商
    • SMIC
    • GIGADEVICE
    • NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS
    • SILAN MICROELECTRONICS
    • HISILICON
    • HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED
    • BYD SEMICONDUCTOR
    • NEXPERIA
    • CHANGXIN MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES
    • YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP
    • GOERTEK MICROELECTRONICS INC.
    • CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED
    • HESAI TECHNOLOGY
    • 其他
  • 在中國的全球製造商
    • NXP SEMICONDUCTORS
    • INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES
    • STMICROELECTRONICS
    • TEXAS INSTRUMENTS
    • RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
  • 合資企業和策略夥伴關係

第4章 中國汽車半導體出口分析

  • 主要出口產品類型
  • 全球半導體出口
  • 中國出口

第5章 中國汽車半導體產業多元化發展

  • 地緣政治因素
  • 供應鏈彈性策略
  • 經濟因素
  • 對全球汽車產業的影響

第6章 替代製造地

  • 概述
  • 替代製造地的比較分析
  • 國家/地區技術優勢
  • 東南亞
    • 馬來西亞
    • 越南
    • 泰國
    • 新加坡
    • 韓國
    • 台灣
  • 北美洲
  • 歐洲
  • 印度

第7章 未來展望與建議

  • 2025 年至 2030 年預測的產業轉變
  • 技術藍圖
  • 向產業相關人員提出策略建議
Product Code: AT 9433

In 2024, China's exports of automotive semiconductors reached USD 419.15 billion in 2024, from USD 280.81 billion in 2020, with a CAGR of 8.9%, driven by increased sales of autonomous and electric vehicles.

China's semiconductor market for the automotive sector is experiencing substantial investment from both domestic and global companies. Major players such as SMIC, Huawei's HiSilicon, YMTC, BYD Semiconductor, and Tsinghua Unigroup are leading domestic efforts, while international firms like Intel, Samsung, and SK Hynix are expanding their presence through joint ventures and new fabrication plants. The Chinese government supports the market with the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund ("Big Fund"), local government funds, subsidies, tax breaks, and low-interest loans, all aimed at achieving self-sufficiency and a complete supply chain. As global demand for advanced electronics and automotive technologies surges, China exports semiconductors worldwide, often using Hong Kong as a trade hub. The rise of modern vehicles, primarily electric and connected cars, has significantly increased the demand for semiconductors, as these vehicles require advanced chips for powertrain control, advanced driver assistance, infotainment, and battery management. Consequently, the automotive sector has become a key driver of semiconductor growth in China.

Memory chips are the second-largest segment in China's automotive semiconductor market.

Memory chips rank second in the Chinese automotive semiconductor market. These chips also hold the second-largest position in the global semiconductor industry due to soaring demand for data storage and processing, driven by AI, data centers, consumer electronics, and advanced automotive technologies. Memory chips are vital for storing and retrieving data in electronic devices, enabling everything from application execution to real-time system operations-an essential requirement for modern vehicles that rely on significant amounts of data for infotainment, ADAS, and autonomous driving features. Memory chips are extensively used in high-end infotainment systems, ADAS, and digital instrument clusters in cars. Electric and autonomous vehicles demand even more memory due to their complex computing and data processing needs. China is focusing on boosting domestic production of mature-node chips while also making significant advancements in advanced memory technology, particularly in NAND and DRAM, with companies like YMTC and CXMT leading the way. YMTC has developed advanced 3D TLC NAND chips that compete with global leaders like Samsung and Micron, while CXMT has produced and released G4 DDR5 DRAM. SMIC has also manufactured 7 nm chips for Huawei's Mate 60 Pro.

India is the second-largest importer of semiconductors from China.

India is the second-largest importer of electronics, integrated circuits, and memory chips worldwide. This is primarily due to the country's robust electronics sector, digitalization, and the lack of large-scale domestic semiconductor manufacturing. In 2024, imports of electronic integrated circuits from China alone reached USD 6.1 million. These components are essential in the automotive sector for advanced features such as infotainment, ADAS, telematics, and digital instrument clusters, which require significant memory and processing power. The Indian market for advanced automotive features is rapidly growing, driven by rising consumer demand for connectivity, safety, and electrification. The adoption of EVs and connected cars is accelerating, supported by government initiatives like the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Hybrid and Electric Vehicles (FAME) scheme. Investment in India's electronics and semiconductor ecosystem is also on the rise, with both domestic and international companies expanding production and R&D. The government has launched incentive programs such as the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme for electronics manufacturing, further increasing demand for imported memory and integrated circuits as local supply struggles to keep pace. Recent examples include automakers like Tata Motors and Mahindra integrating more sophisticated electronics into their latest models, reflecting the broader trend of technology-driven growth in India's automotive and electronics sectors.

Research Coverage:

The report provides an in-depth analysis of the China semiconductor market for automotive, focusing on various types, including microcontrollers, power semiconductors, sensors & MEMS devices, memory chips, and analog & mixed-signal integrated circuits. It examines export trends, the impact of trade policies and restrictions, and the diversification of the semiconductor industry away from China. The report also explores alternative manufacturing destinations, offering a comparative analysis of these locations, along with the challenges and strategies associated with the transition.

Additionally, the report assesses the effects of the global automotive sector on the semiconductor market and presents a future outlook. It includes detailed information about the major factors driving growth in China's semiconductor market. A thorough analysis of key industry players provides insights into their business overviews, product offerings, key strategies, contracts, partnerships, agreements, new product launches, mergers, and acquisitions.

Key Benefits of Buying this Report:

The report provides valuable information for market leaders and new entrants regarding revenue estimates for both the overall automotive semiconductor market in China and its sub-segments. It will assist stakeholders in understanding the competitive landscape, positioning their businesses more effectively, and planning appropriate go-to-market strategies. Additionally, the report offers insights into the current market conditions and highlights key drivers, restraints, challenges, and opportunities within the industry.

The report provides insights into the following points:

  • Analysis of critical drivers (increased domestic investments in semiconductors), restraints (shortage of manufacturing facilities for 12 mm machines), opportunities (substantial investments by <12-inch wafer manufacturers), and challenges (technological gap) influencing the growth of the China semiconductor market for automotive
  • Product Development/Innovation: Detailed insights into upcoming technologies and new products launched in the China semiconductor market for automotive
  • Market Development: Comprehensive market information - the report analyses the authentication and brand protection market across Chinese countries
  • Market Diversification: Exhaustive information about new products & services, untapped geographies, recent developments, and investments in the China semiconductor market for automotive
  • Competitive Assessment: In-depth assessment of market shares, growth strategies, and service offerings of leading players, such as SMIC, GigaDevice Semiconductor Inc., Novosense Microelectronics, Silan Microelectronics, and HiSilicon

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

  • 1.1 GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
  • 1.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
    • 1.2.1 2010-2014
    • 1.2.2 2015-2020
    • 1.2.3 2021-2025
  • 1.3 KEY FACTORS DRIVING INDUSTRY SHIFT FROM CHINA
    • 1.3.1 REGULATORY FACTORS
      • 1.3.1.1 Restrictive controls by US government
      • 1.3.1.2 Chips Act and other global legislation
      • 1.3.1.3 National security concerns
    • 1.3.2 GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS
      • 1.3.2.1 Taiwan Strait tensions
      • 1.3.2.2 Russia-Ukraine war
      • 1.3.2.3 Technology alliances
      • 1.3.2.4 Technology limitations
    • 1.3.3 ECONOMIC AND SUPPLY CHAIN FACTORS
      • 1.3.3.1 Rising manufacturing costs in China
      • 1.3.3.2 Incentives from alternative locations
    • 1.3.4 CHALLENGES
      • 1.3.4.1 Dependency on foreign IP & architecture and gaps in certification
      • 1.3.4.2 Heavy reliance on imported semiconductor manufacturing equipment

2 CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY

  • 2.1 CURRENT STATE OF CHINA'S AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTORS
    • 2.1.1 MICROCONTROLLERS
      • 2.1.1.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities
      • 2.1.1.2 Future roadmap
    • 2.1.2 POWER SEMICONDUCTORS
      • 2.1.2.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities
      • 2.1.2.2 Future roadmap
    • 2.1.3 SENSORS & MEMS
      • 2.1.3.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities
      • 2.1.3.2 Future roadmap
    • 2.1.4 MEMORY CHIPS
      • 2.1.4.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities
      • 2.1.4.2 Future roadmap
    • 2.1.5 ANALOG & MIXED-SIGNAL INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
      • 2.1.5.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities
      • 2.1.5.2 Future roadmap
  • 2.2 MARKET VALUE ASSESSMENT

3 KEY PLAYERS IN CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY

  • 3.1 DOMESTIC MANUFACTURERS
    • 3.1.1 SMIC
      • 3.1.1.1 Overview
      • 3.1.1.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.1.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.1.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.2 GIGADEVICE
      • 3.1.2.1 Overview
      • 3.1.2.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.2.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.2.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.3 NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS
      • 3.1.3.1 Overview
      • 3.1.3.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.3.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.3.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.4 SILAN MICROELECTRONICS
      • 3.1.4.1 Overview
      • 3.1.4.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.4.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.4.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.5 HISILICON
      • 3.1.5.1 Overview
      • 3.1.5.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.5.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.5.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.6 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED
      • 3.1.6.1 Overview
      • 3.1.6.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.6.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.6.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.7 BYD SEMICONDUCTOR
      • 3.1.7.1 Overview
      • 3.1.7.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.7.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.7.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.8 NEXPERIA
      • 3.1.8.1 Overview
      • 3.1.8.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.8.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.8.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.9 CHANGXIN MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES
      • 3.1.9.1 Overview
      • 3.1.9.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.9.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.9.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.10 YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP
      • 3.1.10.1 Overview
      • 3.1.10.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.10.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.10.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.11 GOERTEK MICROELECTRONICS INC.
      • 3.1.11.1 Overview
      • 3.1.11.2 Recent Financials
      • 3.1.11.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.11.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.12 CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED
      • 3.1.12.1 Overview
      • 3.1.12.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.12.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.12.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.13 HESAI TECHNOLOGY
      • 3.1.13.1 Overview
      • 3.1.13.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.13.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.13.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.14 OTHERS
  • 3.2 GLOBAL MANUFACTURERS IN CHINA
    • 3.2.1 NXP SEMICONDUCTORS
      • 3.2.1.1 Overview
      • 3.2.1.2 Recent financials
      • 3.2.1.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.2.1.4 Future strategy
    • 3.2.2 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES
      • 3.2.2.1 Overview
      • 3.2.2.2 Recent financials
      • 3.2.2.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.2.2.4 Future strategy
    • 3.2.3 STMICROELECTRONICS
      • 3.2.3.1 Overview
      • 3.2.3.2 Recent financials
      • 3.2.3.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.2.3.4 Future strategy
    • 3.2.4 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS
      • 3.2.4.1 Overview
      • 3.2.4.2 Recent financials
      • 3.2.4.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.2.4.4 Future strategy
    • 3.2.5 RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
      • 3.2.5.1 Overview
      • 3.2.5.2 Recent financials
      • 3.2.5.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.2.5.4 Future strategy
  • 3.3 JOINT VENTURES AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

4 EXPORT ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTORS

  • 4.1 KEY EXPORT PRODUCT CATEGORIES
  • 4.2 GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS
    • 4.2.1 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (HS CODE 854231)
    • 4.2.2 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES (HS CODE 854232)
    • 4.2.3 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS AMPLIFIERS (HS CODE 854233)
    • 4.2.4 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS) (HS CODE 854239)
    • 4.2.5 PARTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (HS CODE 854290)
  • 4.3 EXPORTS FROM CHINA
    • 4.3.1 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (HS CODE 854231)
      • 4.3.1.1 China
      • 4.3.1.2 Hong Kong, China
    • 4.3.2 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES (HS CODE 854232)
      • 4.3.2.1 China
      • 4.3.2.2 Hong Kong, China
    • 4.3.3 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS AMPLIFIERS (HS CODE 854233)
      • 4.3.3.1 China
      • 4.3.3.2 Hong Kong, China
    • 4.3.4 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS) (HS CODE 854239)
      • 4.3.4.1 China
      • 4.3.4.2 Taipei, China
      • 4.3.4.3 Hong Kong, China

5 DIVERSIFICATION OF CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY

  • 5.1 GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS
    • 5.1.1 US-CHINA TRADE TENSIONS
      • 5.1.1.1 US-China tariffs
      • 5.1.1.2 Diversification strategies
    • 5.1.2 TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS
      • 5.1.2.1 US & Chinese technology export controls
      • 5.1.2.2 Impact of export controls
    • 5.1.3 NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
  • 5.2 SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE STRATEGIES
    • 5.2.1 KNOWLEDGE GAINED FROM COVID-19 PANDEMIC
      • 5.2.1.1 Realization by China after Covid-19
      • 5.2.1.2 Impact on global players
      • 5.2.1.3 Shift from JIT to strategic resilience
  • 5.3 ECONOMIC FACTORS
    • 5.3.1 RISING MANUFACTURING COSTS IN CHINA
      • 5.3.1.1 Cost comparison
      • 5.3.1.2 Bill of Materials
    • 5.3.2 INCENTIVE PROGRAMS IN ALTERNATIVE LOCATIONS
  • 5.4 IMPACT ON GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
    • 5.4.1 EFFECTS ON AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTION COSTS
    • 5.4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN RELIABILITY AND RESILIENCE
    • 5.4.3 REGIONAL MANUFACTURING CLUSTERS
    • 5.4.4 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION PATTERNS

6 ALTERNATIVE MANUFACTURING DESTINATIONS

  • 6.1 OVERVIEW
  • 6.2 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE MANUFACTURING LOCATIONS
    • 6.2.1 RANKING AS ALTERNATIVES TO CHINA
  • 6.3 TECHNOLOGY DOMINANCE, BY COUNTRY/REGION
  • 6.4 SOUTHEAST ASIA
    • 6.4.1 MALAYSIA
      • 6.4.1.1 Government incentives and support
      • 6.4.1.2 Key diversifications
      • 6.4.1.3 Challenges
    • 6.4.2 VIETNAM
      • 6.4.2.1 Government incentives and support
      • 6.4.2.2 Key diversifications
      • 6.4.2.3 Challenges
    • 6.4.3 THAILAND
      • 6.4.3.1 Government incentives and support
      • 6.4.3.2 Key diversifications
      • 6.4.3.3 Challenges
    • 6.4.4 SINGAPORE
      • 6.4.4.1 Government incentives and support
      • 6.4.4.2 Key diversifications
      • 6.4.4.3 Challenges
    • 6.4.5 SOUTH KOREA
      • 6.4.5.1 Government incentives and support
      • 6.4.5.2 Key diversifications
      • 6.4.5.3 Impact of key players
        • 6.4.5.3.1 Samsung
        • 6.4.5.3.2 SK Hynix
      • 6.4.5.4 Challenges
    • 6.4.6 TAIWAN
      • 6.4.6.1 Government incentives and support
      • 6.4.6.2 Key diversifications
      • 6.4.6.3 Impact of key players
        • 6.4.6.3.1 TSMC
      • 6.4.6.4 Challenges
  • 6.5 NORTH AMERICA
    • 6.5.1 GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND SUPPORT
    • 6.5.2 KEY DIVERSIFICATIONS
      • 6.5.2.1 US
      • 6.5.2.2 Mexico
    • 6.5.3 CHALLENGES
  • 6.6 EUROPE
    • 6.6.1 INCENTIVES BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
      • 6.6.1.1 Germany
      • 6.6.1.2 France
      • 6.6.1.3 Italy
    • 6.6.2 EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING HUBS
  • 6.7 INDIA
    • 6.7.1 GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND SUPPORT
    • 6.7.2 KEY DIVERSIFICATIONS
    • 6.7.3 CHALLENGES

7 FUTURE OUTLOOK AND RECOMMENDATIONS

  • 7.1 PROJECTED INDUSTRY SHIFTS, 2025-2030
  • 7.2 TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP
  • 7.3 STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS
    • 7.3.1 DIVERSIFICATION
    • 7.3.2 TECHNOLOGY
    • 7.3.3 SUPPLY CHAIN

List of Tables

  • TABLE 1 AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR COMPONENTS DOMINATED BY CHINA
  • TABLE 2 US EXPORT CONTROLS AND SANCTIONS
  • TABLE 3 SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPORT PROGRAMS
  • TABLE 4 PRICE HIKES OF SEMICONDUCTOR-RELATED MATERIALS BEFORE AND AFTER RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR
  • TABLE 5 TECHNOLOGY ALLIANCES AND THEIR IMPACT ON CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
  • TABLE 6 COUNTRY-WISE INCENTIVES ON SEMICONDUCTOR COMPONENTS
  • TABLE 7 EQUIPMENT AND KEY FOREIGN SUPPLIERS
  • TABLE 8 MICROCONTROLLERS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
  • TABLE 9 POWER SEMICONDUCTORS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
  • TABLE 10 SENSORS & MEMS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
  • TABLE 11 LIDAR: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
  • TABLE 12 MEMORY CHIPS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
  • TABLE 13 ANALOG & MIXED-SIGNAL INTEGRATED CIRCUITS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
  • TABLE 14 SMIC: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 15 SMIC: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 16 SMIC: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 17 GIGADEVICE: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 18 GIGADEVICE: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 19 NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 20 NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 21 NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 22 SILEN MICROELECTRONICS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 23 SILEN MICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 24 SILEN MICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 25 HISILICON: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 26 HISILICON: RECENT FINANCIALS, BY REGION, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 27 HISILICON: RECENT FINANCIALS, BY BUSINESS SEGMENT, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 28 HISILICON: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 29 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 30 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: RECENT FINANCIALS, BY SERVICE, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 31 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: RECENT FINANCIALS, BY END MARKET, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 32 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 33 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 34 BYD SEMICONDUCTOR: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 35 BYD SEMICONDUCTOR: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 36 BYD SEMICONDUCTOR: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 37 NEXPERIA: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 38 NEXPERIA: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 39 NEXPERIA: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 40 CHANGXIN MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 41 CHANGXIN MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 42 YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 43 YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 44 YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 45 GOERTEK MICROELECTRONICS INC.: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 46 GOERTEK MICROELECTRONICS INC.: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 47 CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 48 CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 49 CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 50 HESAI TECHNOLOGY: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 51 HESAI TECHNOLOGY: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 52 HESAI TECHNOLOGY: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 53 OTHER CHINESE AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURERS: RECENT FINANCIALS AND PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED
  • TABLE 54 NXP SEMICONDUCTORS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 55 NXP SEMICONDUCTORS: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 56 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 57 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 58 STMICROELECTRONICS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 59 STMICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 60 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 61 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 62 RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 63 RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 64 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURERS IN CHINA
  • TABLE 65 GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS, BY PRODUCT, 2020-2024 (USD BILLION)
  • TABLE 66 CHINA SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS, BY PRODUCT, 2020-2024 (USD BILLION)
  • TABLE 67 EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD BILLION)
  • TABLE 68 EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD BILLION)
  • TABLE 69 EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 70 EXPORTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS), BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 71 EXPORTS OF PARTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 72 CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 73 HONG KONG, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 74 CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 75 HONG KONG, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 76 CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS AMPLIFIERS, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 77 HONG KONG, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS AMPLIFIERS, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 78 CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS), BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 79 TAIPEI, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS), BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 80 HONG KONG, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS), BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 81 US-CHINA TARIFFS, 2023-2025
  • TABLE 82 US TARIFFS ON KEY CHINESE PRODUCTS/COMPONENTS
  • TABLE 83 CHINESE SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURERS' DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES
  • TABLE 84 US TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS AND IMPACT ON CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
  • TABLE 85 CHINESE TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS AND IMPACT ON US AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
  • TABLE 86 CHINA'S ALLEGATIONS OF CYBERSECURITY AND ESPIONAGE
  • TABLE 87 GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN RECALIBRATION: KEY EXAMPLES
  • TABLE 88 COST COMPARISON OF AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTORS, 2020-2021 VS. 2024-2025
  • TABLE 89 BILL OF MATERIALS OF AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTORS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 90 INCENTIVES/SUBSIDIES FOR AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING OUTSIDE CHINA
  • TABLE 91 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE MANUFACTURING LOCATIONS
  • TABLE 92 TECHNOLOGY DOMINANCE, BY COUNTRY/REGION
  • TABLE 93 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO MALAYSIA AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 94 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO VIETNAM AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 95 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO THAILAND AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 96 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO SINGAPORE AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 97 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO SOUTH KOREA AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 98 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO TAIWAN AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 99 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO US AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 100 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO MEXICO AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 101 INCENTIVES FOR AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
  • TABLE 102 EUROPEAN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING HUBS
  • TABLE 103 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO INDIA AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 104 AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP, 2024-2030
  • TABLE 105 STRATEGY FOR COUNTRY SELECTION
  • TABLE 106 STRATEGY FOR TECHNOLOGY SELECTION
  • TABLE 107 STRATEGY FOR COLLABORATIVE MODELS

List of Figures

  • FIGURE 1 SEMICONDUCTOR TECHNOLOGY TREND, 1987-2023
  • FIGURE 2 GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS, 2020 VS. 2024
  • FIGURE 3 CHINA AND HONG KONG SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS, 2020 VS. 2024