部署微電網作為網絡安全解決方案

本報告審視了近期為應對新出現的網絡安全威脅而做出的監管努力，並提供了諸如應如何配置微電網以降低網絡安全風險脆弱性等信息。它提供。

內容

前言

背景

建議

微電網作為潛在的網絡安全解決方案

影響微電網軟件供應商和 OEM 的新網絡安全標準

歐洲面臨來自國家行為者的進一步威脅

分佈式能源並網帶來的新安全隱患

FERC 命令 2222 可能會增加 DER 聚合導致的漏洞

部署不足的微電網可以傳播網絡安全攻擊媒介

最易受攻擊的通信協議

選擇保護性微電網通信協議

外圍防禦提供的保護不足

以同等懷疑態度對待內部和外部用戶的零信任架構

ZTA 持續驗證

ZTA 將影響降至最低

ZTA 自動化上下文收集和響應

微電網可以與 ZTA 集成以增強網絡安全

重要的微電網配置提供獨特的網絡安全優勢

通過網絡微電網通信識別攻擊

通過網絡分段隔離威脅

可以抵禦網絡攻擊的微電網

虛假數據注入攻擊

拒絕服務攻擊

智能跟蹤防火牆

信號欺騙/中間人攻擊

使用穿越行程閾值

微電網可用作網絡安全措施

入侵檢測

自動化事件響應

蜜罐

公用事業和其他消費者必須遵循網絡安全防禦最佳實踐

採用零信任架構

部署多種威脅檢測策略

始終獨立於或通過 IPv4 網絡部署 IPv6 網絡

微電網供應商和 OEM 需要將網絡安全納入設計

美國微電網軟件開發商和製造商必須利用能源部新的網絡安全研發計劃和資金

清潔能源網絡安全加速器計劃

網絡安全、能源安全和應急撥款辦公室

應考慮網絡安全產品的 EaaS 微電網供應商

After domestic extremists attempted several attacks against US bulk electric system (BES) components in 2022, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission warned of a likely escalation of attacks on BES in 2023 and directed the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to tighten rules for low-risk systems from vulnerabilities introduced either intentionally or by accident by authorized vendors in electrical component supply chains. NERC's new rules, announced in March 2023, extend many of the same cybersecurity requirements to low-risk system components it imposes on more critical systems.

In a broader effort to address virtual threats, the Biden administration released the U.S. National Cybersecurity Strategy, which articulates how the White House intends to address cybersecurity threats even as it embarks on the largest expansion of US infrastructure since establishing the interstate highway system.

This Guidehouse Insights study reviews recent regulatory efforts to address emerging cybersecurity threats and explores how microgrids should be configured to reduce their vulnerability to cybersecurity risks. It also looks at how they can be deployed as active cybersecurity solutions, countermeasures that can identify, isolate, and eliminate cybersecurity threats, mitigate damages, and help stakeholders meet new, more stringent cybersecurity regulations.

Table of Contents

Spark

Context

Recommendations

Microgrids Can Be Cybersecurity Solutions

New Cybersecurity Standards Are Impacting Microgrid Software Vendors and OEMs

Europe Faces Additional Threats from State Actors

Distributed Energy Resources Integration Creates New Security Risks

FERC Order 2222 Could Increase Vulnerabilities from DER Aggregations

Poorly Deployed Microgrids Can Open Cybersecurity Attack Vectors

Communications Protocols Present the Greatest Vulnerability

Selecting a Protective Microgrid Communications Protocol

Perimeter Defenses Provide Insufficient Protection

Zero-Trust Architectures Treat Internal and External Users with Equal Suspicion

ZTAs Continuously Verify

ZTAs Minimize Impact

ZTAs Automate Context Collection and Response

Microgrids Can Be Integrated with ZTAs for Additional Cybersecurity

Critical Microgrid Configurations Provide Unique Cybersecurity Benefits

Networked Microgrid Communications Identify Attacks

Network Segmentation Isolates Threats

Microgrids Can Defend Against Cyberattacks

False Data Injection Attacks

Denial of Service Attacks

Smart Tracking Firewall

Signal Spoofing / Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

Ride-Through and Trip Threshold Manipulation

Microgrids Can Operate as Cybersecurity Countermeasures

Intrusion Detection

Automated Incident Response

Honey Pots

Utilities and Other Consumers Should Follow Best Cybersecurity Defense Practices

Employ a Zero-Trust Architecture

Deploy Multiple Threat Detection Strategies

Always Deploy IPv6 Networks Independently of, or Tunneled over, IPv4 Networks

Microgrid Vendors and OEMs Should Incorporate Cybersecurity at the Design Stage

U.S. Microgrid Software Developers and Manufacturers Should Avail Themselves of New DOE Cybersecurity R&D Programs and Funding

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator Program

Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response Grants

EaaS Microgrid Vendors Should Explore Cybersecurity Offerings

List of Tables

Summary and Evaluation of Potential Microgrid Communication Protocols

List of Figures

Five Pillars of the U.S. National Cybersecurity Strategy and Their Related Strategic Objectives, March 2023

Zero-Trust Implementation Scheme for Remote Access to a Networked Microgrid